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Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in MDY Industries v.
Blizzard Entertainment
By Michael Czolacz*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in order to
facilitate the transition to legal distribution of copyrighted materials over the internet.1
Section 1201, which has been described as the heart of the DMCA,2 facilitates this goal
by establishing three new causes of action that copyright holders may bring against
individuals who bypass electronic measures protecting copyrighted materials and those
who assist these individuals.3
The enactment of these anti-circumvention provisions has resulted in unintended
consequences when applied in the context of what has been referred to as “aftermarket
parts” cases.4 Aftermarket parts cases involve products that interact with products that
are created by another manufacturer and are protected by technological protection
measures. The manufacturer of the protected product sues the manufacturer of the
compatible product for violating § 1201’s ban on the circumvention of technological
protection measures. The first of these cases to reach a federal appellate court led the
Federal Circuit to adopt an essentially non-textual requirement. To establish liability
under § 1201, the copyright owner must demonstrate a nexus between the circumventor’s
actions and traditional copyright infringement of one of the exclusive rights of copyright
owners protected under § 106 of the Copyright Act.5
In late 2010, the Federal Circuit’s construction of § 1201 was rejected by the Ninth
Circuit, which declined to adopt the nexus requirement.6 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that § 1201’s anti-circumvention provisions created a new property right against
circumvention distinct from the traditional exclusive rights of copyright owners
enumerated in § 106.7 The Ninth Circuit’s approach facilitates “aftermarket parts”
litigation and gives copyright owners greater legal control of their copyrighted material if
they protect that material with electronic security measures than the same copyright
owners would have over their material if no electronic security measures were employed.
*

Juris Doctor Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013.
See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
673, 680-81 (2000).
2
Id. at 704.
3
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
4
Lindsey M. Shinn, Passwords and Keys under the DMCA: A Call for Clarification from the Courts or
Congress, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1173, 1179-80 (2009).
5
See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
6
See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
7
See id.
1
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If the Ninth Circuit’s approach prevails, the owners of copyrighted software protected
with electronic security measures will be able to bring cases against rival manufacturers
who design products that interact with the products created by the copyright owners.
This comment analyzes and critiques this circuit split regarding the nexus
requirement for establishing liability under § 1201. It begins by analyzing the statutory
provisions at issue, proceeds to a discussion of the holding and rationale of both the
Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit decisions, and finally advocates for a position that
reconciles the Federal Circuit’s functionalist approach with the Ninth Circuit’s textualist
approach. This position would call for the judicial adoption of a limited definition of the
statutory term “access” in § 1201, which has gone undefined up to this point.
This comment is organized into several sections. Section II of this comment
reviews the traditional exclusive rights of copyright owners under § 106 of the Copyright
Act and discusses the relevant statutory provisions of the DMCA. Section III illustrates
the intended application of § 1201 of the DMCA by reviewing the Second Circuit’s
decision in Universal Studios vs. Corley,8 the first federal appellate decision construing
the DMCA. Section IV reviews the holding and rationale of Chamberlain Group., Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies Inc.,9 in which the Federal Circuit adopted a non-textual nexus
requirement into § 1201(a). Section V reviews the reasoning in MDY Industries, LLC v.
Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,10 the recent Ninth Circuit opinion rejecting the Federal
Circuit’s rationale in Chamberlain. Section VI analyzes the merits of these two
approaches and argues that the positions of the two circuit courts can be reconciled via
the adoption of a more restrictive definition of the statutory term “access” in § 1201. The
definition excludes purely mechanical interaction between technologies, which facilitates
interoperability, but does not result in individuals gaining audio or visual access to
copyrighted material. Section VII considers the merits of and ultimately rejects the
viability of two alternative means of reconciling the positions of the two circuits: a liberal
construction of § 1201(f)’s reverse engineering exception or a reliance on the
purchaser/licensee distinction to distinguish the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Finally, Section
VIII considers the potential constitutional questions that may be raised should the
Supreme Court elect to grant certiorari in order to resolve the circuit split.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: SECTIONS 106 AND 1201 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
A. The Traditional Rights of Copyright Owners Under § 106 of the Copyright Act

¶6

Traditionally, the exclusive rights of copyright owners have been limited to those
enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright Act.11 These rights include: (1) the right to
reproduce copies of the copyrighted work, (2) the right to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work, (3) the right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to
the public, and (4) the right to perform and display the work publicly. 12 Individuals who

8

273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cr. 2004).
10
629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
11
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
12
Id.
9
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violate these exclusive rights and individuals who knowingly facilitate the infringement
of these rights are liable for copyright infringement under § 501 of the Copyright Act. 13
Notably, these traditional rights do not result in the imposition of liability on
individuals who merely view or listen to copyrighted work without paying for it.
Consequently, an individual who reads a copyrighted book at the bookstore or views
copyrighted material which has been posted on a website is not liable for copyright
infringement under § 106.
B. Understanding and Differentiating DMCA § 1201’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions

¶8

Section 1201(a) of the DMCA contains three distinct, but similarly worded causes
of action. Cases that construe the DMCA typically do so by first analyzing the
relationship between the three provisions. Section 1201(a)(1)(A) provides: No Person
shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under [Title 17 – the Copyright Act].14 Section 1201(a)(2)(A) provides:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component or part thereof that
is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
[Title 17 – United States Copyright Law].15

Sections 1201(a)(2)(B) and (C) extend this ban to products with only limited commercial
purpose other than circumvention and to products marketed by a person who knows the
product will be used to circumvent technological measures.16
¶9
Sections 1201(a)(3)(A) and (B) define two key statutory phrases employed in §§
1201(a)(1) and (a)(2). “To ‘circumvent a technological measure’ means to descramble a
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or impair a technological measure without the authority of the copyright
owner, to gain access to the work.”17 “A technological measure ‘effectively controls
access to a work’ if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the
application of information or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright
owner, to gain access to the work.”18
¶10
Although worded similarly to § 1201(a)(2)’s anti-trafficking provision, §
1201(b)(1)(A) introduces a third cause of action and prohibits slightly different conduct:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology product, service, device, component or part thereof that
is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection

13

Id. § 501.
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
15
Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A).
16
Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B)-(C).
17
Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
18
Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
14
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afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner.19

Whereas § 1201(a)(2) prohibits the trafficking in devices that facilitate unauthorized
access to protected works, § 1201(b)(1) prohibits the trafficking of devices that
circumvent technological measures implemented to protect the traditional § 106 exclusive
rights of copyright owners.
¶11
The differences between these statutory provisions are best illustrated by an
example. Suppose Bob was the legal owner of a DVD containing a copyrighted movie.
This DVD was protected by software preventing Bob from making copies of the DVD.
Bob purchases a program from Fred that Fred promises will bypass this anti-copying
software, allowing Bob to make copies of the DVD. In this example, Fred is liable under
§ 1201(b)(1) because the software he sold was designed to allow the DVD to be copied
and the copying of copyrighted material is forbidden under § 106. Fred would not be
liable under § 1201(a)(2) because the software he is marketing does not facilitate
unauthorized access, as the DVD’s owner, Bob, who lawfully purchased the DVD,
already has the right to access its content.
¶12
Section 1201 also contains a plethora of exceptions to the three causes of action
established in §§ 1201(a) and (b). Section 1201(d) permits libraries to gain access to
commercially exploited copyrighted work in order to make a good faith determination of
whether or not to acquire a copy of that work.20 Section 1201(f) permits a person who
has lawfully obtained the right to use a computer program to circumvent a technological
measure solely for the purpose of identifying and analyzing the elements of the program
that are necessary to achieve interoperability with an independently created computer
program.21 Section 1201(a)(1)(C) empowers the Librarian of Congress to make
regulations creating exceptions to § 1201(a)(1)(A) for persons who are “adversely
affected . . . in their ability to make non-infringing uses under this title of a particular
class of copyrighted works.”22
¶13
Violators of the anti-circumvention provisions in § 1201 are subject to the civil
remedies in § 120323 and may be subject to additional criminal penalties if they acted
willfully and for the purposes of commercial gain.24 The civil remedies available
include: (1) temporary and permanent injunctions,25 (2) actual damages,26 (3) statutory
damages between $200 and $2,500 per act of circumvention,27 and (4) extra damages for
repeated violators.28

19

Id. §1201(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1201(d).
21
Id. § 1201(f).
22
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
23
Id. § 1203(a).
24
Id. § 1204(a).
25
Id. § 1203(b)(1).
26
Id. § 1203(c)(1)(A).
27
Id. § 1203(c)(3)(A).
28
Id. § 1203(c)(4).
20

444

Vol. 11:5]

Michael Czolacz

III. UNIVERSAL STUDIOS V. CORLEY: THE DMCA AS APPLIED TO PREVENT THE
UNAUTHORIZED DISTRIBUTION OF DIGITAL CONTENT
Universal Studios Inc. v. Corley, 29 the first federal appellate case requiring an
analysis of § 1201, illustrates the application of § 1201’s provisions in the context that
Congress originally intended. The technological protection measure at issue in Corley
was the Content Scrambling System (“CSS”). CSS was an encryption algorithm
designed and used by film studios to allow DVDs to be played while preventing them
from being copied or otherwise manipulated.30 To combat CSS protection, a group of
hackers created “DeCSS,” a computer program with the sole function of decrypting the
CSS protection of DVDs. This program would allow DeCSS users to create unauthorized
copies of the copyrighted DVDs in violation of § 106.31
¶15
Defendant Corley operated 2600.com, a website about computer hacking32 and
posted an article on this site discussing DeCSS. This article contained both the object
and source code of DeCSS.33 Universal Studios and several other studios that distribute
DVDs protected by CSS sued Corley alleging a violation of § 1201’s anti-trafficking
provisions: §§ 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1).34 Because CSS protects against the creation of
copies—an exclusive right of copyright owners under § 106—and DeCSS exists
exclusively to circumvent CSS, Corley presumably violated § 1201(b)(1) by posting
DeCSS on his website.35 The Second Circuit interpreted the distinction between §
1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1) as differentiating between the ability to control access to
copyrighted material and the ability to prevent copying of that material. 36 Despite
correctly distinguishing between these two provisions earlier in its opinion, the Second
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding of liability under § 1201(a)(2)(A)’s anti-access
provision, instead of applying § 1201(b), suggesting the difficulty courts have had
differentiating between these two provisions.37
¶16
Corley is notable primarily for illustrating § 1201’s intended context: cases
involving the trafficking in technologies that can lead to the illegal copying and viewing
of copyrighted works that have been distributed to the public. Ironically, after Corley,
most of the federal appellate cases involving DMCA have occurred outside of this
context.
¶14

IV. THE DMCA OUTSIDE OF ITS TRADITIONAL CONTEXT: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADOPTS
A NEXUS REQUIREMENT IN § 1201(A)(2) IN CHAMBERLAIN V. SKYLINK
¶17

The Federal Circuit was first required to consider the proper application of § 1201
in Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Tech, Inc.,38 a case outside the traditional context of
29

273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 436.
31
Id. at 437-38.
32
Id. at 439.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 441.
37
Id.
38
381 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
30
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copyright infringement. In Chamberlain, the plaintiff, the Chamberlain Group,
manufactured a line of garage door openers that were protected by a copyrighted “rolling
code” computer program that constantly changed the transmitter signal needed to open
the garage door as a security measure and activated the garage door motor once it
detected the correct code.39 The defendant, Skylink Technologies, manufactured a
universal garage door opener that was compatible with the plaintiff’s openers, but did not
infringe Chamberlain’s copyrighted code.40 Chamberlain alleged that by marketing a
product capable of bypassing its “rolling code program,” a technological measure that
controlled access to the portion of its program that operated the garage door, Skylink
violated § 1201(a)(2).41 Chamberlain did not allege that Skylink’s actions constituted
either copyright infringement or contributory copyright infringement.42
¶18
The Federal Circuit refused to hold Skylink liable and adopted a requirement that
any plaintiff alleging a violation of § 1201(a)(2) must establish, inter alia, that the
conduct circumventing an access measure infringes or facilitates the infringement of an
exclusive right of copyright owners enumerated in the Copyright Act.43 The court
articulated several reasons for this conclusion.
¶19
First, the Federal Circuit began with a textual analysis, noting that the definitions of
the phrases, “circumvent a technological measure” and “effectively controls access to a
work” established in §§ 1201(a)(3)(A) and (B) both require that these actions be
performed “without the authority of the copyright owner.”44 However, the court noted
that the authority of the copyright owner, with respect to copyrighted work that has been
made available to the public, is limited to the exclusive rights, established in § 106, that
the copyright owner retains once the work is distributed to the public. A fortiori, the
court concluded that a copyright owner’s “authority” under § 1201 does not include the
authority to restrict the public from taking any actions beyond those actions which would
implicate a right retained by the copyright owner under § 106. 45 Therefore, the court
concluded that devices, such as Skylink’s universal garage door opener, that circumvent
measures preventing access, but do not infringe or facilitate infringement, cannot be said
to be undertaken “without the authority of the copyright owner” because copyright
owners have no authority to restrict the actions at issue in the first place. 46 Consequently,
the court determined that circumvention measures which do not constitute copyright
infringement cannot be undertaken “without the authority of the copyright owner” under
the statute, making § 1201(a) inapplicable unless the circumvention at issue was
committed in order to facilitate traditional copyright infringement.
¶20
The court noted that adopting a construction of the statute that did not require a
nexus would implicitly create a new right for copyright holders, creating two distinct
copyright regimes. One of these regimes would govern the rights of copyright holders
who did not employ technological measures under § 106. The second regime would

39

Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1183.
41
Id. at 1185.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1203.
44
Id. at 1182-83.
45
Id. at 1200.
46
Id.
40
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govern copyright owners who employed technological measures to protect their work,
and would give copyright owners “unlimited rights to hold circumventors liable under §
1201 merely for accessing that work, even if that access enabled only those rights that the
Copyright Act grants to the public.”47
¶21
The Federal Circuit went on to conclude that this second regime would be
problematic for three reasons. First, it would conflict with antitrust laws and copyright
misuse laws by creating after-market monopolies for any manufacturer who employed
copyrighted software in its products and protected those products with a technological
measure restricting access.48 Second, this interpretation would be internally inconsistent
with § 1201(c)(1) of the DMCA, which provides that: “[n]othing in this section shall
affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair
use under this title” by creating new rights for copyright owners.49 Third, this
construction would prevent consumers from engaging in explicitly fair uses of the
products that they purchased because any non-infringing work or conduct that facilitates
infringement constitutes fair use.50
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT REJECTS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CONSTRUCTION OF § 1201 IN
MDY INDUSTRIES V. BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT
In MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 51 the Chamberlain court’s
analysis was rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which enthusiastically adopted the “two
copyright regimes” construction of § 1201 that was criticized by the Federal Circuit in
Chamberlain. The copyrighted material at issue in MDY involved World of Warcraft
(WoW) a “massively multiplayer online roleplaying game” in which players create
avatars that virtually interact with each other and their environment virtually on servers
maintained by the game’s creator, Blizzard Entertainment.52 Playing WoW requires both
the purchase of the game’s client software and the payment of a monthly subscription fee
in order to retain access to the game’s servers. Access to these servers is conditioned
upon each player’s approval of Blizzard’s Terms of Use Agreement.53
¶23
The defendant, MDY Industries, manufactured and sold “Glider,” a program that
interacted with WoW by allowing the game’s players to advance their avatars without
requiring the players to be physically present at their computers.54 In an effort to prevent
this conduct, Blizzard designed and launched “Warden,” a program designed to detect
Glider and block players who were running Glider from connecting to Blizzard’s
servers.55 MDY then modified Glider to avoid detection by Warden. 56 This response, in
turn, led Blizzard to sue MDY, alleging several theories of liability: (1) contributory
copyright infringement for inducing WoW’s players to violate the term of use prohibiting
¶22

47

Id.
Id. at 1201.
49
Id. at 1202.
50
Id.
51
629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
52
Id. at 935.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 935.
55
Id. at 936.
56
Id.
48
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the use of Glider, (2) §§ 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) trafficking liability for selling Glider,
which circumvented Warden, and (3) tortious interference of contract for inducing
Blizzard’s subscribers to violate its Terms of Use Agreement, which prohibited the use of
Glider.57
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by addressing Blizzard’s copyright
infringement claim. Because players’ access to Blizzard’s servers was conditioned on
their approval of Blizzard’s terms of use, the court concluded that WoW’s players were
licensees rather than owners of the game.58 In order to establish copyright infringement
based on the breach of a licensing agreement governing the use of a copyrighted work,
the breach of contract, which is the basis of the claim, must be one that implicates a right
protected under U.S. copyright law.59 Because the use of Glider by WoW’s players did
not implicate any of Blizzard’s rights relating to its status as a copyright owner, the court
concluded that MDY could not be held liable for contributory copyright infringement.60
The court next discussed Blizzard’s DMCA claim. Blizzard argued that by
marketing Glider, which was designed to bypass Warden, Blizzard’s anti-circumvention
measure, MDY was liable for violating § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1). Because the court
had already determined that MDY’s conduct did not implicate any right of copyright, it
held that Blizzard could not establish a claim under § 1201(b)(1).61
The court then addressed Blizzard’s § 1201(a)(2) claim. The first obstacle to the
application of § 1201(a)(2) in Blizzard’s favor was the fact that Warden only restricted
players’ ability to access Blizzard’s servers and not their ability to access the game’s
copyrighted files, which were stored on players’ hard drives.62 The district court resolved
this issue by conceptually severing the software’s copyrighted material into “literal
elements” (“the code stored on player’s hard drives”), “individual non-literal elements”
(“the discrete visual and audible components of the game”), and “dynamic non-literal
elements” (“the real-time experience of traveling through different worlds, hearing their
sounds, viewing their structures, encountering their inhabitants and monsters, and
encountering other players”).63 The Ninth Circuit adopted the district court’s distinction
and concluded that Warden qualified as a “technological measure that effectively
controlled access” to a protected work with respect to WoW’s dynamic non-literal
elements.64 Having reached this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to construe the
provisions of § 1201.65
Had the Ninth Circuit adopted the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Chamberlain,
Blizzard’s § 1201(a)(2) claim would have been dismissed for the same reason Blizzard’s
copyright infringement claim was dismissed: because Glider did not facilitate the
violation of any of Blizzard’s rights under § 106. Instead, the Ninth Circuit declined to
adopt the Federal Circuit’s nexus requirement and concluded that § 1201(a)(2) implicitly

57

Id. at 936.
Id. at 938.
59
Id. at 940.
60
Id. at 941.
61
Id. at 954-55.
62
Id. at 942.
63
Id. at 942-43.
64
Id.
65
Id.
58
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provides copyright owners who encrypt their works with a new property right against the
circumvention of this encryption.66
¶28
The Ninth Circuit began by comparing the text of § 1201(a)(2) with the text of §
1201(b)(1).67 Since § 1201(b)(1) explicitly relates to a technological measure “that
effectively protects the rights of a copyright owner,” whereas § 1201(a)(2) proscribes the
circumvention of any technological measure without adopting the language employed in
§ 1201(b)(1), the court concluded that the textual difference in the statutes imply that no
nexus to copyright infringement was required for a § 1201(a)(1) violation.68 To the Ninth
Circuit, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation rendered § 1201(b)(1) superfluous whereas
declining to adopt such a nexus made both provisions meaningful.69 The court derived
further textual evidence supporting its position from § 1201(a)(3)(A)’s definition of the
phrase “circumvent a technological measure,” which provides examples of circumvention
that do not necessarily relate to infringement.70
¶29
The Ninth Circuit rationalized the absence of a nexus requirement as necessary to
facilitate Congress’s desire to prevent trafficking in devices that facilitate the viewing of
copyrighted material, which is not a violation of any of the § 106 rights unless that
viewing entails making a copy of the work.71 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
constructing the statute without a nexus requirement would further Congress’s goal of
facilitating the digital distribution of copyrighted material: one of the stated objectives of
the DMCA.72
¶30
The Ninth Circuit then considered and rejected the position adopted by the Federal
Circuit in Chamberlain.73 The court reconciled its view of the statute with § 1201(c) by
acknowledging that § 1201(a) created a new right and stating that this right was unrelated
to the rights and defenses preserved in the rest of the copyright statute, and therefore
“[did] not disturb the balance between public rights and the traditional rights of copyright
owners under the Copyright Act.”74 The Ninth Circuit dismissed the Federal Circuit’s
antitrust and copyright misuse concerns as not relevant to the instant case because
Blizzard was not seeking to put a direct competitor out of business and promised to deal
with them in the future should they arise.75 The court also noted that any policy concerns
could be mitigated by the Library of Congress’s ability to prescribe exceptions to anticircumvention statutes if it concluded that doing so would further the public interest.

66

Id. at 945.
Id. at 944.
68
Id. at 944-46.
69
Id. at 946.
70
Id. at 945.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 948.
74
Id. at 950-51.
75
See id. at 951 (“Concerning antitrust law, we note that there is no clear issue of anti-competitive
behavior in this case because Blizzard does not seek to put a direct competitor who offers a competing roleplaying game out of business and the parties have not argued this issue. If a § 1201(a)(2) defendant in a
future case claims that a plaintiff is attempting to enforce its DMCA anti-circumvention right in a manner
that violates antitrust law, we will consider the interplay between this new anti-circumvention right and
antitrust law.”).
67
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VI. ANALYSIS
A. The Problematic Nature of the Holdings in Chamberlain and MDY
¶31

Though the Ninth Circuit and the Federal Circuit appear to have reached radically
different conclusions, their views can be reconciled more easily than it might first appear.
The Federal Circuit’s valid desire to prevent aftermarket monopolies led it to adopt a
non-textual nexus requirement for § 1201(a). The Ninth Circuit’s focus on the
discrepancies between the Federal Circuit’s approach and the plain language of the
statute led it to adopt an unnecessarily broad holding that implicates the valid policy
issues that the Federal Circuit expressed concern about in Chamberlain.
¶32
Neither court attempted to distinguish between cases in which the unauthorized
access at issue involved: (1) an individual circumventing a technological protection
measure in order to view protected copyrighted material or (2) a mechanical interaction
necessary to facilitate interoperability between devices or software programs with
different manufacturers. Part B of this Section advocates that the statutory term “access”
should be interpreted in a way that takes this distinction into account.
¶33
As the Ninth Circuit recognized, the legislative history of the DMCA includes
examples suggesting liability in cases in which no nexus to copyright infringement
exists.76 The House Judiciary Committee Report discusses § 1201(a)(2), stating:
The act of circumventing a technological protection measure put in place by a
copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work is the electronic
equivalent of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book.77

Bypassing a password to break into a locked room and view a copyrighted work does not
implicate any of the rights enumerated in § 106: the right to reproduce the copyrighted
work, the right to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute copies of the work by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or the right to perform the copyrighted work.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit’s nexus requirement is inconsistent with the intent of
Congress, which clearly meant to use § 1201(a)’s causes of action to prevent individuals
from using technological measures to view technologically protected copyrighted
material intended to be restricted to paying customers. Section 1201 was necessary
because this conduct does not infringe upon any of § 106’s exclusive rights.
¶34
The Federal Circuit’s incorporation of the § 106 rights as a limit on the statutory
“authority” retained by copyright holders is also problematic from a textual perspective.
Section 1201(a)(3)(A) provides that to “‘circumvent a technological measure’ means to
descramble a scrambled work . . . without the authority of the copyright owner.” In this
provision,78 “authority” is undoubtedly used to mean: “with the consent or permission of
the copyright owner.” There is nothing in the statute suggesting that the term “authority”
relates in any way to the rights conferred on copyright owners pursuant to § 106, which
appears in a different section of the Copyright Act describing the “exclusive rights” of
copyright owners without ever referring to their “authority.” The Federal Circuit’s
incorporation of the § 106 rights meaning of the term “authority” seems especially
76

Id. at 947.
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998).
78
As well as § 1201(a)(3)(B).
77

450

Vol. 11:5]

¶35

¶36

¶37

¶38

Michael Czolacz

strained given that § 1201(b)(1)(A) explicitly refers to conduct which “circumvents a
technological measure . . . that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner.” This
provision suggests that Congress explicitly intended to incorporate § 106 rights into §
1201 and therefore did not intend to incorporate these rights by other means, such as via
the undefined statutory term “authority.”
The Ninth Circuit’s analytical approach in MDY is problematic because it ignores
the serious policy consequences articulated by the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain. The
Ninth Circuit brushed aside the potential antitrust or copyright misuse concerns of the
Federal Circuit because they were not implicated by the facts of MDY. Any judicial
construction of a statute should address concerns raised by all of the classes of cases that
arise under that statute, not merely the concerns present in the case providing the
occasion for the judicial construction. If another § 1201 case presented concerns not at
issue in MDY that could only be obviated by adopting a new and conflicting construction
of the statute, the Ninth Circuit would be forced to reverse itself.
The Ninth Circuit’s lack of concern for other cases that could potentially arise
under § 1201(a) is especially striking given the unique products at the center of the
litigation in MDY. Blizzard’s WoW business model requires players to maintain a
connection with Blizzard’s servers (and consequently, with the other players connected to
these servers) in order to play the game. Most products, even those sold digitally, do not
require purchasers to maintain an internet connection with their creator’s servers and
other owners of the product in order for the product to function. Moreover, the vast
majority of products do not rely on an internal virtual economy to keep their purchasers
satisfied, which Blizzard contended MDY’s conduct was disrupting by allowing Glider
users to stockpile in-game resources while they were away from their computers.
In short, the typical case that would be determined by the presence or absence of a
nexus requirement in § 1201(a) is far more likely to resemble the fact pattern that the
Federal Circuit considered in Chamberlain, which did raise antitrust and copyright
misuse concerns, than the fact pattern the Ninth Circuit considered in MDY, which did
not. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s decision seems flawed in that it adopts a statutory
construction that creates obvious policy concerns, but then brushes them aside until those
concerns are presented in a future case.
The Ninth Circuit also ignored the policy consequences of not facilitating the
creation of products that interoperate with other products designed by a different
manufacturer (“interoperable products”). Interoperable products lower entry barriers for
inventors because innovations can take advantage of existing infrastructures.79 They can
also lower the cost of replacement products for consumers by creating competition
between manufacturers as opposed to giving the original manufacturer a monopoly over
interoperable products and replacements of consumable products. They also allow a
wider variety of inventors to try their hand at improving an existing product, rather than
limiting the development of a product solely to that product’s manufacturer. 80 The
presence of a competitive market for aftermarket parts is therefore likely to spur
innovation.
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Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
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B. Reconciliation of the Two Approaches via the Adoption of a More Restrictive
Definition of the Statutory Term “Access”
¶39

¶40

¶41

¶42

¶43

Since the Ninth Circuit’s textual and legislative history arguments suggesting the
absence of a nexus appear to be correct and the Federal Circuit’s policy concerns appear
to be well-founded, a construction of the statute that takes both of these considerations
into account is needed. Such an approach should not adopt a nexus requirement, while
facilitating the bypassing of anti-circumvention measures undertaken for the purpose of
achieving interoperability, thereby avoiding the antitrust and copyright misuse concerns
raised by the Federal Circuit. This approach must also, of course, be consistent with the
language of § 1201 and the terms of art defined therein.
The desired statutory construction can be achieved by defining the statutory term
“access” to include only conduct that has the result of allowing an individual (who may
or may not be the individual who engaged in the circumvention) to see and/or hear the
copyrighted aspects of a work. Such an approach would not violate any statutory
language. Although the phrase “effectively controls access to a work” is statutorily
defined, the term “access” is neither defined nor associated with any examples of who or
what is capable of gaining access in any of the statutory provisions in which it appears.
Limiting the meaning of the term “access” to encompass only access that results in
individuals gaining sensory access would preserve liability in the “breaking into a locked
house to gain access to a copyrighted book” examples described in the DMCA’s
legislative history because the access in that example is sensory access by an individual.81
This limitation would also exclude the “access” at issue in Chamberlain, which was the
acceptance of the transmission of a signal by copyrighted software and did not result in
any “access” in the form of unauthorized sensory perception of copyrighted material by
an actual individual. Applied to the facts in MDY, MDY would still be liable for
violating § 1201(a) because Glider allowed Blizzard’s players to circumvent Warden and
perceive the dynamic non-literal copyrighted elements of WoW. Limiting the definition
of “access” to “access that allows individuals to see or hear copyrighted material” would
therefore preserve the holdings of all of the cases involving § 1201(a) as well as the
hypothetical example of liability suggested in § 1201(a)’s legislative history.
Consequently, the proposed approach would not affect the liability of any of the cases
addressed by Congress or the federal appellate courts and provide a basis for reconciling
the Federal and Ninth Circuits.
This approach, of course, assumes that Congress did not intend the DMCA to
impose liability in the Chamberlain class of cases, a class in which the definition that this
comment proposes would prevent a finding of liability. As demonstrated below, both the
text and the legislative history of § 1201 support this assumption.
The legislative history of the DMCA focuses exclusively on aiding the distribution
of copyrighted work over the internet and does not suggest any intent to limit the creation
of interoperable works.82 Furthermore, pre-DMCA law permitted fair use defenses to
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See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17.
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716 (characterizing the House and Senate debates prior to the DMCA’s adoption as centering on the issue
of whether or not the anti-circumvention provisions restrict too much fair use of copyrighted material).
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copyright infringement where the infringement in question was committed for the
purpose of designing a program compatible with the copyright owner’s code.83
¶44
Further evidence that Congress did not intend to use § 1201(a) to prevent the
design of products that operate with copyrighted software can be found in one of §
1201’s exceptions to §§ 1201(a) and (b) liability. Section 1201(f)(1) specifically protects
reverse engineering performed to achieve interoperability:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who has
lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of
that program for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of
the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently
created computer program with other programs, and that have not previously
been readily available to the person engaging in the circumvention, to the extent
any such acts of identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under
this title.84

Section 1201(f)’s exemption from liability for circumvention cases, where the
circumvention is performed to achieve interoperability, suggests that it values the
creation of interoperable devices over its ban on circumvention. The presence of this
exemption further evinces the fact that the DMCA was not intended to create the
aftermarket monopolies feared by the Federal Circuit. This conclusion is consistent with
the antitrust and copyright misuse concerns recognized by the Federal Circuit. The
legislative history is also consistent with the conclusion that Congress intended the
DMCA to facilitate the distribution of copyrighted works over the internet. It is that
concern, not any focus on preventing interoperability, that dominated the legislative
discussion prior to the DMCA’s passage.
VII.

¶45

TWO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR RECONCILING CHAMBERLAIN AND MDY:
BROAD CONSTRUCTION OF § 1201(F) AND RELIANCE ON THE
PURCHASER/LICENSEE DISTINCTION

As one scholar has suggested, a liberal construction of § 1201(f) would probably
achieve the same goals as those attained by the definition of “access” proposed in this
comment.85 However, § 1201(f) is too limited to protect interoperability because it only
applies to “computer programs” and not a wider range of copyrighted works, such as the
garage door opener at issue in Chamberlain. It is also unclear whether § 1201(f) protects
products that repeatedly circumvent technological protection measures in order to
function or whether it only protects circumvention that occurs during the process of
creating an interoperable product. Section 1201(f) has also rarely been analyzed by the
judiciary,86 because courts that adopt the Federal Circuit’s approach would have little
reason to consider it. In § 1201(a) cases analyzed under the Federal Circuit’s
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Chamberlain approach—where § 1201(f) could potentially be raised as an affirmative
defense—plaintiffs will be unable to satisfy the nexus requirement, rendering § 1201(f)
superfluous.87
Unlike §1201(f), the limited definition of “access” advocated in this article
preserves interoperability across the spectrum of copyright cases, as opposed to only
“computer programs.” The “access” approach is also preferable to the adoption of a
broad construction of § 1201(f) because it would preserve judicial efficiency by not
requiring the issue to be raised as an affirmative defense, allowing a larger number of
cases to be resolved on the pleadings.
Another potential ground for reconciling Chamberlain and MDY is that
Chamberlain involved the circumvention of a technological protection measure in a
product that was sold to users, whereas MDY involved the circumvention of a product
whose access was governed by a license. The possibility of requiring a nexus to
copyright infringement in cases involving sales and not requiring a nexus in license cases
was not foreclosed by the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain, who reserved the issue for
possible future consideration.88
However, differentiating between circumvention of measures in products that have
been sold and circumvention of measures in products that have been licensed is
problematic in several respects.
First, the DMCA was enacted by Congress to protect the digital distribution of
copyrighted materials. Giving licensees additional causes of action for breach of license
and giving them access to the DMCA’s generous remedy provisions does not further this
goal. As the facts of MDY demonstrate, software licenses can be breached in a number of
ways that do not implicate software distributors’ ability to securely distribute their
products to the public. Furthermore, relying on a licensee/purchaser distinction to
reconcile the Ninth and Federal Circuits is also problematic because the federal courts of
appeals have adopted divergent standards for determining which conditions imposed
upon the use of a product create a valid license.89 This could lead to the circumvention of
technological protection measures of a product to be actionable under the DMCA in one
federal circuit and not another because of different underlying tests for determining what
constitutes a valid license. This resolves one federal circuit split by magnifying the
effects of another. Additionally, individuals who traffic in products whose only function
is to enable the breach of a contract are already liable for tortious interference of contract
under state law, which may render extending § 1201(a) protection to licenses largely
superfluous.
Finally, a distinction between the applicability of § 1201(a) to owners and licensees
has no textual basis in § 1201 itself. Section 1201 contains no text that distinguishes
between whether the technological measure at issue has been used to circumvent a
87

17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) was raised as an affirmative defense in Chamberlain, but this issue was never
reached by the court because of the nexus requirement.
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Chamberlain Group., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 n.17 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It is not
clear whether a consumer who circumvents a technological measure controlling access to a copyrighted
work in a manner that enables uses permitted under the Copyright Act but prohibited by contract can be
subject to liability under the DMCA. Because Chamberlain did not attempt to limit its customers’ use of its
product by contract, however, we do not reach this issue.”).
89
Cf. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010), with Krause v. Titleserv Inc., 402 F.3d
119 (2d Cir. 2005).
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license or not. The phrase “works protected under [Title 17]” which establishes the scope
of § 1201’s protection, applies to works which have been both sold to the public and
licensed to the public. Accordingly, giving § 1201 a broader applicability in cases
involving licensed material, as the Federal Circuit’s Chamberlain footnote discusses, is
an unsatisfying and inadequate means of reconciling Chamberlain and MDY.
VIII.

THE MDY APPROACH—TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE?

¶51

Should the circuit split regarding the correct construction of DMCA § 1201(a)
persist, one of its most significant consequences may be its effect in establishing the
scope of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which provides: The Congress shall
have the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.90
¶52
In Chamberlain, the Federal Circuit alluded to the possible unconstitutionality of
the Ninth Circuit’s construction of § 1201(a) when applied to limit the use of
interoperable products.91 As the Chamberlain court noted, it is difficult to argue that
third-party products that beneficially interact with technologically protected copyrighted
works by imposing § 1201(a) liability could promote the arts or sciences.
¶53
The analytical approach employed by the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft also
suggests that the Ninth Circuit’s construction of § 1201(a) may be unconstitutional.92 In
Eldred, the Court held that the law in question was constitutional because it did not “alter
the traditional contours of copyright protection.”93 Section 1201(a) as construed by the
Ninth Circuit alters the contours of copyright law dramatically by giving the creators of
copyrighted materials who employ technological measures to protect those materials a
right against unwanted interaction with any product that circumvents those protections.
The MDY court conceded as much by recognizing that § 1201 creates new rights
unprotected in § 106. If the court were to grant certiorari to resolve the § 1201(a) circuit
split, doing so could be a vehicle to limit Congress’s exercise of the Copyright Clause;
much as it defined the scope of Congress’ ability to exercise the Commerce Clause in
United States v. Lopez94 and United States v. Morrison.95
IX. CONCLUSION
¶54

Enacting changes to a well-established copyright regime to account for the
development of new technologies is not an easy task. This is evident in the fact that the
DMCA, which Congress implemented in order to facilitate the distribution of copyrighted
90

U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 6.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200 (“[A]s the Supreme Court recently explained, ‘Congress’s exercise of
its Copyright Clause authority must be rational’ . . . Chamberlain’s proposed construction of § 1201(a)
implies that in enacting the DMCA, Congress attempted to ‘give the public appropriate access’ to
copyrighted works by allowing copyright owners to deny all access to the public. Even under the
substantial deference due Congress, such a redefinition borders on the irrational.”).
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material over the internet, has given rise to a class of cases not contemplated by the
statute. These cases involve plaintiffs, who manufacture a product protected by a
technological anti-circumvention measure, suing manufacturers of an unlicensed product
that is compatible with the plaintiff’s product.
¶55
By construing the statutory concept of “access” to include access that involves only
the interaction between two types of software as opposed to restricting “access” to access
that facilitates the viewing of a copyrighted work, courts have concluded that this class of
cases is actionable under the DMCA. In Chamberlain, the Federal Circuit attempted to
prevent the adverse policy consequences of the Ninth Circuit’s approach by adopting a
non-textual element into § 1201(a)(2) claims—the requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate
that there was a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and traditional copyright
infringement. This nexus requirement is problematic because it erases the textual
distinction between § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1). Furthermore, it permits the
trafficking in anti-circumvention devices that allow the unauthorized viewing of digitally
protected works. The DMCA’s legislative history suggests that this form of unauthorized
access was precisely the problem Congress was concerned with when it enacted the
DMCA in 1998.
¶56
The unintended consequences of § 1201 liability in interoperability cases can be
resolved by distinguishing between the cases brought under § 1201(a) that the statute was
meant to apply to, like Corley, and those to which it was not–cases analogous to
Chamberlain. Limiting the meaning of the word “access” to apply only to access that
grants individuals the ability to hear or see a technologically protected copyrighted work
would allow courts to make this distinction. This approach is consistent with the text of §
1201 since the word “access” is never connected to any subject in any statutory provision
in which it appears. This proposed approach would resolve the split between the Ninth
and Federal Circuits created by Chamberlain and MDY and avoid the textual problems
presented by the Federal Circuit’s nexus requirement and the policy consequences that
the Ninth Circuit failed to adequately address.
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